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There are many challenges stemming from ambiguous statu-
tory provisions of section 1021 of the 2012 National Defense 
Authorization Act.1 Section 1021 expands the scope of the ex-
ecutive branch’s detention authority under the post-September 
11th Authorization for Use of Military Force and allows indefi-
nite detention of individuals deemed to be part of or substan-
tially supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces in 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition allies. 
While that may not strike you as problematic on its face, con-
sider that we do not know the definition of many of the opera-
tive words in section 1021. What constitutes “substantial sup-
port”? Who or what are “associated forces”? To make matters 
considerably worse, the “we” who do not know what section 
1021 means includes the Congress that drafted the statute, the 
President who signed it into law while simultaneously claiming 
it is meaningless, and the federal courts, which are not inclined 
to save the other two branches of government from themselves. 
With the United States now in the second decade of its fight 
against transnational terrorist groups, there is considerable un-
certainty as to what effect section 1021 has on the scope of the 
executive branch’s armed conflict detention authority, not on 
distant battlefields, but here in the United States. That is trou-
bling for a variety of reasons, and this Article will focus on three. 
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First, it is troubling that we are not sure if section 1021 allows 
the President to order the indefinite detention of a U.S. citizen 
or lawful resident alien captured in the United States. Review-
ing the legislative process which yielded section 1021 is dis-
tressing and disturbing. Our system of government relies on, or 
maybe assumes, the various branches will operate as checks 
and balances on each others. Yet with section 1021 the legisla-
tive and executive branches have abdicated their responsibility 
and kicked the proverbial can down the road to the judiciary. 
So we now face a Hobson’s choice of either hoping for an activ-
ist judiciary which will mitigate the civil liberties risks the oth-
er branches of government have created, or wanting a judiciary 
that acts within its constitutionally mandated limitations, rec-
ognizing that section 1021 may survive challenge as a result. 
Second, it is troubling because the prospect of indefinite de-
tention and trial by military commission upsets a long-standing 
balance within the U.S. criminal procedure system, whereby law 
enforcement essentially has to choose, or prioritize, between pro-
tecting the public and prosecuting offenders. This choice is made 
possible by the public safety exception from New York v. Quarles2 
that modifies our understanding of the Miranda warning re-
quirements.3 Since September 11th the government has made 
expansive use of the public safety exception, altering the balance 
between rights and security.4 The development of section 1021 
and the availability of indefinite detention fundamentally alters 
the long-standing risk calculus under which law enforcement 
operated. We have, or should have, observed this change in the 
differing manner in which law enforcement responded to and 
treated a foreign citizen arrested in Detroit after attempting to 
bomb a transatlantic flight compared to that of a U.S. citizen al-
leged to have bombed the Boston Marathon.5 Section 1021 be-
came law in between those two events, and it may account for 
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why U.S. law enforcement afforded the U.S. citizen far less in 
civil liberties than the foreign national. 
Finally, it is troubling that there is not much in the way of cur-
rent discussion on section 1021 and the contemporary challenges 
of balancing freedom and security. Yet now is when we need to 
have the conversation, in the relative calm, cool light of day. If 
history is any guide, and it is, this debate will resurface reactively 
and emotionally following the next instance of someone with ex-
plosives in their underwear, their shoes, their SUV at Times 
Square, or after an attack like that during the Boston Marathon. 6 
We know that we often come to regret the decisions we make 
when emotionally compromised. It is in that moment of emotion-
al excitement when we may finally and fully see the civil liberties 
risk of section 1021 in the form of the indefinite detention without 
trial of a U.S. citizen captured in the United States. My goal today 
is that by outlining where are now with section 1021, and how we 
reached this point, we can avoid our otherwise inevitable future, 
one which we will equally inevitably lament. 
I. SECTION 1021 
It is instructive to consider the final wording of section 1021, 
the drafting debate in Congress, the President’s action in sign-
ing the NDAA into law, and how federal courts have construed 
the provisions. As enacted, section 1021 reads: 
SEC. 1021. AFFIRMATION OF AUTHORITY OF THE 
ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES TO DETAIN 
COVERED PERSONS PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORIZA-
TION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Congress affirms that the authority of the 
President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursu-
ant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public 
Law 107–40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) includes the authority for 
the Armed Forces of the United States to detain covered per-
sons (as defined in subsection (b)) pending disposition un-
der the law of war. 
(b) COVERED PERSONS.—A covered person under this section 
is any person as follows: 
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 (1) A person who planned, authorized, committed, or 
aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 
2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks. 
 (2) A person who was a part of or substantially support-
ed al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are en-
gaged in hostilities against the United States or its coali-
tion partners, including any person who has committed a 
belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in 
aid of such enemy forces. 
(c) DISPOSITION UNDER LAW OF WAR.—The disposition of a 
person under the law of war as described in subsection (a) 
may include the following: 
 (1) Detention under the law of war without trial until the 
end of the hostilities authorized by the Authorization for 
Use of Military Force. 
(2) Trial under chapter 47A of title 10, United States Code 
(as amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (ti-
tle XVIII of Public Law 111–84)). 
(3) Transfer for trial by an alternative court or competent 
tribunal having lawful jurisdiction. 
(4) Transfer to the custody or control of the person’s 
countryof origin, any other foreign country, or any other 
foreign entity. 
(d) CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section is intended to 
limit or expand the authority of the President or the scope of 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force. 
(e) AUTHORITIES.—Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention 
of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United 
States, or any other persons who are captured or arrested in 
the United States. 
(f) REQUIREMENT FOR BRIEFINGS OF CONGRESS.—The Secretary 
of Defense shall regularly brief Congress regarding the ap-
plication of the authority described in this section, including 
the organizations, entities, and individuals considered to be 
‘‘covered persons’’ for purposes of subsection (b)(2).7 
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Although the focus of this article is on the meaning of section 
1021, it is both notable and curious that Congress drafted legis-
lation concerning indefinite detention not as a standalone bill, 
but buried in a 565-page defense appropriations act.8 But before 
discussing what members of Congress claim the legislation 
does and does not mean, analyzing the plain language of sec-
tion 1021 is in order. 
As the title indicates, section 1021 affirms the authority of the 
U.S. military to detain certain categories of individuals (cov-
ered persons), pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force (AUMF). The use of the word “affirms” is interest-
ing. Affirm is defined as “to assert as confirmed,”9 which is 
ironic given that Congress disagrees as to the meaning of that 
which it claims to affirm in section 1021. 
The title then links the categories of persons, the “covered 
persons,” with the AUMF. This is more than a little disingenu-
ous as the definition of covered persons in section 1021 is well 
beyond the scope of the AUMF. Congress enacted the AUMF in 
the aftermath of the September 11th terror attacks. The relevant 
portions of the AUMF provide: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and ap-
propriate force against those nations, organizations, or per-
sons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aid-
ed the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, 
or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to pre-
vent any future acts of international terrorism against the 
United States by such nations, organizations or persons.10 
Thus, Congress authorized the President to use force, but only 
against those entities involved with the September 11th attacks. 
Although the AUMF does not specifically authorize detention, 
the U.S. Supreme Court held in its 2004 Hamdi decision that de-
tention is “so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to 
be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress 
has authorized the President to use.”11 
																																																																																																																						
 8. See id. 
 9. Affirm—Definition and More from the Free Merriam-Webster Dictionary, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/affirm [http://perma.cc/5LCM 
-9TLS] (last visited Oct. 26, 2014). 
 10. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 11. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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Section 1021, while claiming that “[n]othing in this section is 
intended to limit or expand the authority of the President or the 
scope of the Authorization for Use of Military Force,”12 does just 
that, at least in terms of the President’s detention authority. 
There are two categories of persons to whom section 1021 ap-
plies. The first is the same as from the AUMF, those “who 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks 
that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those respon-
sible for those attacks.”13 The second category of persons ex-
pands the scope of detention authority by including anyone 
“who was a part of or substantially supported al Qaeda, the Tal-
iban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against 
the United States or its coalition partners, including any person 
who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported 
such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.”14 
This second category of covered persons is replete with un-
certainty. What does it mean to be part of or substantially sup-
port al Qaeda or the Taliban? Who or what are the associated 
forces? What is required to engage in hostilities? Who are the 
coalition partners of the United States? What constitutes a bel-
ligerent act? What constitutes direct support, and is that a dif-
ferent level of support than substantial? Had Congress set out 
to draft a vague and confusing statute it could not have done 
better, and this in just the beginning of section 1021. 
While section 1021 is unclear on who exactly is covered, what 
may be done to those individuals, whoever they are, is more 
straightforward. Section 1021 provides that the “disposition” of 
a covered person may include: (1) “[d]etention under the law of 
war without trial until the end of the hostilities authorized by 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force”; (2) trial by military 
commission; (3) transfer to an alternate court or tribunal; and (4) 
“transfer to the custody . . . of the person’s country of origin,” or 
any other foreign country or entity.15 It is the first possible dispo-
sition, indefinite law-of-war-based detention which is, or should 
be, the greatest source of controversy. 
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When will the end of hostilities authorized by the AUMF oc-
cur? Arguably those hostilities will not end until the death or 
capture of all those who planned, authorized, committed or 
aided the September 11th attacks. But there is not, indeed could 
not be, any way of reaching that point or knowing if the U.S. 
had managed to do so. Thus while the word “indefinite” is not 
contained in section 1021, it is more intellectually honest to use 
that term instead of the fiction Congress employed, which sug-
gests that there are known or knowable bounds to the length of 
permissible detention without trial. 
Thus far we have discussed a detention statute in which we are 
unclear to whom it applies and for how long, but amazingly we 
are still not yet at the confusing portion. While there is a proce-
dural briefing requirement technically at the end of section 1021, 
the substantive provision concludes by stating that “[N]othing in 
this section shall be construed to affect existing law or authorities 
relating to the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident 
aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are cap-
tured or arrested in the United States.”16 In essence this subsec-
tion means that the current status quo regarding the legality of 
detaining a U.S. citizen or lawful resident alien outside the U.S. 
or detaining anyone in the United States remains unchanged. Yet 
there is no agreement as to what that status quo is. We now turn 
to what Congress claims section 1021 does and does not do. 
Normally reviewing the legislative history provides a modicum 
of clarity as to congressional intent. With section 1021, the legisla-
tive history only exacerbates the confusion. 
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
A. House Armed Services Committee 
In May 2011, early in the legislative process for the NDAA, 
the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) issued a report 
on what ultimately became section 1021 but was at the time 
numbered section 1034.17 The committee noted that the terrorist 
threat facing the United States had evolved and that “[a]l 
Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces still pose a grave 
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 17. H.R. REP. NO. 112-78 (2011) 
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threat to U.S. national security.”18 The committee continues by 
claiming that the AUMF “necessarily includes the authority to 
address the continuing and evolving threat posed by these 
groups.”19 This is an interesting claim given that the AUMF on-
ly addressed entities responsible for the September 11th at-
tacks. While the AUMF certainly covers al Qaeda and the Tali-
ban, to what extent “associated forces,” some of which were 
not formed until after September 11th, are included is question-
able. The committee then states that it “supports the Executive 
Branch’s interpretation of the AUMF, as it was described in a 
March 13, 2009, filing before the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.”20 
B. 2009 DOJ AUMF Filing 
In that March 13, 2009 filing, the Department of Justice made 
several assertions concerning the AUMF, with which the HASC 
apparently agrees. In that filing, DOJ repeated the grant of 
AUMF Force authority “to detain persons that the President 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the ter-
rorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, and persons 
who harbored those responsible for those attacks.”21 But DOJ 
also claimed that through the AUMF: “[t]he President also has 
the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substan-
tially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces 
that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners, including any person who has committed a 
belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of 
such enemy armed forces.”22 
So the Congress initially provided a limited grant of authori-
ty in the AUMF. The AUMF addresses those who planned, au-
thorized, committed or aided the September 11th attacks. The 
executive branch then interpreted that grant to include other 
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 19. Id. 
 20. Id. (referring to Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s 
Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held at Guantanamo Bay, In re Guan-
tanamo Bay Detainee Lit., Misc. No. 08-442 (TFH) (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009) [herein-
after Guantanamo Memo]). 
 21. Guantanamo Memo, supra note 20, at 2. 
 22. Id. 
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individuals who engage in other activities beyond those listed 
in the AUMF. The executive branch’s interpretation includes 
associated forces who support hostilities against the U.S. or un-
identified coalition partners. The HASC then supported the 
executive branch’s concept of what it claims Congress original-
ly intended in the AUMF. 
If Congress had actually intended the AUMF to mean what 
the executive branch claims, then no further legislation would 
be required. But Congress ultimately included the executive 
branch’s version of what Congress intended in the AUMF in 
section 1021. This means that either the covered person lan-
guage is superfluous and Congress was merely affirming its 
earlier grant of authority, or Congress was modifying the use 
of force authority through a single section of a massive defense 
appropriations act. The former would be needless and confus-
ing, while the latter would be disingenuous and disconcerting. 
The March 13, 2009 filing also makes other claims which, 
given the HASC’s support, factor into what section 1021 was 
intended to mean. These claims include that: (1) it is “neither 
possible nor advisable, however, to attempt to identify, in the 
abstract, the precise nature and degree of ‘substantial support,’ 
or the precise characteristics of ‘associated forces,’ that are or 
would be sufficient to bring persons and organizations within 
the foregoing framework”; (2) the AUMF does not “limit the 
‘organizations’ it covers to just al-Qaida or the Taliban”; (3) the 
AUMF is not limited to persons captured on the battlefields of 
Afghanistan”; and (4) the threshold for detention is lower than 
that for direct participation in hostilities.23 
The last point warrants explanation. Direct participation in 
hostilities is a law-of-war term and refers to the activity level 
that renders a civilian the lawful object of attack.24 Normally 
civilians may not be made the object of attack, but when they 
directly participate in hostilities they may be targeted with le-
thal force. The DOJ filing is correct that “[L]aw-of-war princi-
ples do not limit the United States’ detention authority to this 
																																																																																																																						
 23. Id. at 2, 7. 
 24. Ryan Goodman, The Detention of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 103 AM. J. INT’L 
L, 48, 51–54 (2009) (distinguishing four groups of individuals and explaining the 
difference between direct and indirect participation). 
182 Federalist Edition [Vol. 2 
	
limited category of individuals.”25 Indeed the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, which covers civilians, outlines the circumstances 
under which civilians may be detained.26 The threshold for de-
tention is lower than the direct participation standard—it is 
when the civilian poses an imperative security threat.27 The 
DOJ filing makes reference to the prisoner of war detention 
provisions of the Third Geneva Convention, but only to coun-
ter claims that direct participation is too high a threshold.28 The 
filing neither acknowledges the imperative security threat 
standard for detention of civilians from the Geneva Conven-
tions nor offers an alternative. 
Over the course of the next six months the NDAA under-
went changes as part of the legislative process. The Congres-
sional Record from December 2011 reveals several sessions in 
which the Senate debated the NDAA in general and section 
1021 in particular.29 This legislative history sheds light—albeit 
not clarity—on what Congress intended in section 1021 and 
how agreement on the final wording was reached. 
C. House and Senate Debates 
The Senate Armed Services Committee developed a different 
version of section 1021 which included a “limitation” stating 
that the detention authority “does not extend to the detention 
of citizens or lawful resident aliens of the United States on the 
basis of conduct taking place within the United States except to 
the extent permitted by the Constitution.”30 
This language seems to attempt to codify the Fourth Circuit’s 
analysis in Padilla,31 that the Supreme Court’s Hamdi decision 
was not predicated on the capture location, but on the location 
of the alleged misconduct. Hamdi was captured in Afghani-
stan, where he was engaging in armed conflict against the 
																																																																																																																						
 25. Guantanamo Memo, supra note 20, at 8. 	 26. ICRC, Commentary: IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, 258 (Jean S. Pictet gen. ed., 1958). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Guantanamo Memo, supra note 20, at 8–9. 
 29. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S8619 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011); 157 CONG. REC. 
S8079 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011). 
 30. S. 1253, 112th Cong. § 1031(d) (2011). 
 31. Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 393–94 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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United States.32 The Fourth Circuit focused more on Hamdi 
having taken up arms against the United States than the loca-
tion in which he was doing so. Under the Fourth Circuit’s 
analysis, detaining Padilla in the United States was permissible 
because prior to returning to the United States, Padilla, similar 
to Hamdi, had been “armed and present in a combat zone [Af-
ghanistan] during armed conflict between al Qaeda/Taliban 
forces and the armed forces of the United States.”33 
But following discussions, the SASC reported a revised ver-
sion of the bill which removed the limitation regarding deten-
tion of citizens and lawful resident aliens based on domestic 
conduct. The SASC also added a provision which stated that, 
“[n]othing in this section is intended to limit or expand the au-
thority of the President or the scope of the [AUMF].”34 
At this point, the Obama Administration issued a statement 
that what would become section 1021 was unnecessary because 
the authority it attempted to codify already existed, and ex-
pressed concern about potential unintended consequences 
from legislative action in this area.35 
D. Final Version of Section 1021 
Senator Dianne Feinstein looms large in the legislative de-
velopment of section 1021. Early on in the legislative process 
she unsuccessfully proposed an amendment that would have 
provided: “The authority described in this section for the [mili-
tary] to detain a person does not include the authority to detain 
a citizen of the United States without trial until the end of hos-
tilities.”36 She later successfully proposed an amendment which 
became section 1021(e), the authorities portion of the bill which 
states that the section changes nothing. It was this amendment 
that allowed section 1021 to ultimately pass.37 
																																																																																																																						
 32. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 33. Padilla, 423 F.3d at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 34. S. 1867, 112th Cong. § 1031 (2011). 
 35. See 157 CONG. REC. S7937, S7952 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 2011). 
 36. See 157 CONG. REC. S8079, S8094–125 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011); 157 CONG. REC. 
S7685 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 2011). 
 37. 157 CONG. REC. S8079, S8122, S8125 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Feinstein). 
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She provided a helpful, if depressing, description of how the 
Senate reached that point. According to Feinstein: 
There is a difference of opinion as to whether there is [a] 
fundamental flaw [in what would be section 1021]. We [re-
ferring to a group of Democratic Senators] believe the cur-
rent bill essentially updates and restates the authorization 
for use of military force that was passed on September 18, 
2011. Despite my support for a general detention authority, 
the provision in the original bill, in our view, went too far. 
The bill before us would allow the government to detain 
U.S. citizens without charge until the end of hostilities. We 
have had long discussion on this. 
The disagreement arises from different interpretations of 
what the current law is. The sponsors of the bill believe that 
current law authorizes the detention of U.S. citi-
zens . . . without trial until “the end of hostilities” which, in 
my view, is indefinitely. 
Others of us believe that current law, including the Non-
Detention Act that was enacted in 1971, does not authorize 
such indefinite detention of U.S. citizens arrested domestical-
ly. The sponsors believe that the Supreme Court’s Hamdi case 
supports their position, while others of us believe that Hamdi, 
by the plurality opinion’s express terms, was limited to the 
circumstance of U.S. citizens arrested on the battlefield in Af-
ghanistan, and does not extend to U.S. citizens arrested do-
mestically. And our concern was that section [1021] of the bill 
as originally drafted could be interpreted as endorsing the 
broader interpretation of Hamdi and other authorities. 
So our purpose [in amending 1021 with what would be the final 
language] is essentially to declare a truce, to provide that section 
[1021] does not change existing law, whichever side’s view 
is the correct one. So the sponsors can read Hamdi and other 
authorities broadly, and opponents can read it more narrow-
ly, and this bill does not endorse either side’s interpretation, 
but leaves it to the courts to decide.38 
Feinstein’s reference to the Non-Detention Act of 197139 is 
important. Under that statute, “[N]o citizen shall be impris-
oned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursu-
																																																																																																																						
 38. Id. at S8122 (emphasis added). 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012). 
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ant to an Act of Congress.”40 Feinstein apparently views that 
section 1021 is not itself an Act of Congress within the meaning 
of the Non-Detention Act. 
Also of note, while Feinstein hews to the line that section 
1021 “restates” the AUMF, she notes that it also “updates” the 
AUMF. 41  Ultimately Feinstein “leaves the courts to decide” 
what exactly Congress intended.42 In that same session Senator 
Durbin shared that view, stating that the import of section 1021 
is that “the Supreme Court will ultimately decide who can and 
cannot be detained indefinitely without a trial.”43 
Clearly there was, and presumably still is, disagreement 
about the current state of the executive branch’s authority to 
detain U.S. citizens in the United States. Where exactly the dis-
agreement is remains unclear. Cases like Hamdi, Padilla, and al-
Marri44 stake out the different attitudes towards the detention 
of U.S. citizens or lawful resident aliens based on situs of cap-
ture versus conduct, and whether that conduct was in the past, 
ongoing, or believed to occur in the future. 
As we have discussed, the Hamdi case provides the one and 
possibly only touchstone from which views then diverge. The 
Supreme Court upheld the law of war detention of Hamdi, a 
U.S. citizen captured in Afghanistan where he was engaging in 
hostilities.45 The Padilla case highlights the extent to which the 
location of capture versus activity issue is dispositive.46 The al-
Marri case involved a lawful resident alien detained in the 
United States whom the Bush administration designated an 
enemy combatant and initially held without charge, trial, or 
access to an attorney.47 Neither Padilla nor al-Marri reached the 
Supreme Court, thus leaving the argument at the different in-
terpretations of Hamdi Senator Feinstein described. 
																																																																																																																						
 40. Id. 
 41 . 157 CONG. REC. S8079, S8122 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011) (statement of  
Sen. Feinstein). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at S8124 (statement of Sen. Durbin). 
 44. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 
(4th Cir. 2008); Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005). 
 45. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. 
 46. Padilla, 423 F.3d at 393–94. 
 47. Al-Marri, 534 F.3d at 219–20. 
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E. Indefinite Detention of U.S. Citizens 
At one point during the debate over section 1021, Republican 
Senator Lindsey Graham posited a hypothetical for the consid-
eration of Democratic Senator Carl Levin: 
So in a situation where an American citizen goes to Pakistan 
and gets radicalized in a madrasah, gets on a plane and flies 
back to Dulles Airport, gets off the plane and takes up arms 
against his fellow citizens . . . and starts randomly shooting 
people, the law we are trying to preserve is current law, 
which would say if the experts decide it is in the Nation’s best 
interests, they can hold that American citizen as they were 
able to hold the American citizen helping the Nazis . . . . 
[W]e want to preserve the ability of the intelligence commu-
nity to hold that person under the law of war and find out: 
Is anybody else coming? Are you the only one coming? 
What do you know? What madrasah did you go to? How 
did you get over? How did you get back? 
We want to preserve their ability to hold that person under 
the law of war for interrogation. But we also concede, if they 
think it is better to give them their Miranda rights, they can. 
That is what [section 1021] will do. Does the Senator agree 
with that? 
Mr. LEVIN. “I do.”48 
The House debate on December 14, 2011 was even more 
pointed, and bipartisanly so. Democratic Congresswoman Bar-
bara Lee spoke against section 1021 and entered into the record 
a letter from 26 retired United States admirals and generals 
which expressed support for striking section 1021 altogether, or 
in the alternative that, “[a]t the very least, the current detention 
provisions merit public debate and should not be agreed to be-
hind closed doors and tucked into legislation.“49 
Republican Congressman Tom McClintock stated that sec-
tion 1021: 
Specifically affirms that the President has the authority to 
deny due process to any American the government charges 
with “substantially supporting al Qaeda, the Taliban or any 
associated forces,” whatever that means. 
																																																																																																																						
 48. 157 CONG. REC. S8079, S8100–01 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011). 
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Would “substantial support” of “associated force” mean linking a 
Web site to a Web site that links to an al Qaeda site? We don’t 
know. The question before us is: Do we really want to find out? 
We’re told not to worry, the bill explicitly states that nothing 
in it shall alter existing law. But wait—there is no existing law 
that gives the President the power to ignore the Bill of Rights 
and detain Americans without due process. There is only an 
assertion by the last two Presidents that this power is inherent 
in an open-ended and ill-defined war on terrorism. But it is a 
power not granted by any act of Congress until now. 
What this bill says is, what Presidents have only asserted, 
Congress now affirms in statute. 
We’re told this merely pushes the question to the Supreme 
Court to decide if indefinite [detention] is compatible with 
any remaining vestige of our Bill of Rights. Well, that’s a good 
point if the court were the sole guardian of the Constitution. 
But it is not. If it were, there were would be no reason to re-
quire every Member of Congress to swear to preserve, pro-
tect, and defend the Constitution. We are also its guardians. 
And today we, who have sworn fealty to that Constitution, 
sit to consider a bill that affirms a power contained in no law 
and that has the full potential to crack the very foundation of 
American liberty.50 
Democratic Congressman John Conyers, the ranking mem-
ber of the House Judiciary Committee, noted that the question 
of indefinite detention “has never gone before the House Judi-
ciary Committee—never.”51 Conyers went on to insert a letter 
from Judge William Sessions, former Director of the FBI. Judge 
Sessions claimed that section 1021: 
[W]ould for the first time codify authority for methods such 
as indefinite detention without charge . . . to virtually any-
one picked up in antiterrorism efforts, including those ar-
rested on U.S. soil . . . . 
Some have argued that section [1021] simply reiterates cur-
rent law and by doing so maintains the status quo. That is 
not the case. This very dangerous provision would author-
ized the President to subject any suspected terrorist who is 
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captured within the United States—including U.S. citizens 
and U.S. persons—to indefinite detention without charge. 
The provision does not limit such detention authority to 
people captured on the battlefield. Importantly, although 
subsection (e) of this provision states that the provision 
should not be “construed to affect existing law or authori-
ties” relating to detention of “persons who are captured or 
arrested in the United States,” the reality is that current law 
on the scope of such executive authority is unsettled.52 
Judge Sessions then provided a reminder of why the domes-
tic detention authority question remained unsettled—that the 
two times post September 11th when the issue arose, the execu-
tive branch “changed course so as to avoid judicial review.”53 
Here Judge Sessions referred to the 2005 Padilla case which in-
volved a U.S. citizen, and the 2008 al-Marri case which involved 
a legal permanent U.S. resident. 
Both Padilla and al-Marri were detained in the U.S. and per 
Judge Sessions: 
the U.S. government claimed that the President had the au-
thority to detain a suspected terrorist captured within the 
United States indefinitely without charge or trial. In both 
[cases], however, before the Supreme Court could hear the 
case and evaluate this claim, the Justice Department re-
versed course and charged the defendant with criminal of-
fenses to be tried in civilian court. Thus, this extreme claim 
of executive detention authority for people captured within 
the United States has never been tested, and the state of the 
law at present is unclear. Passage of [Section 1021] would 
explicitly provide this authority by statute for the first time, 
thereby clearly, and dangerously, expanding the power for 
indefinite detention.54 
Congressman Conyers also asked an important and as of yet 
unanswered question about why an amendment to exempt 
American citizens from indefinite detention failed in the Sen-
ate. Conyers added that: 
If we were concerned about preserving the civil liberties and 
constitutional protections for American citizens, why did it 
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fail? In addition, if existing laws prohibit this, why did we 
not specify this in the bill? Although supporters of this bill 
continue to claim that this bill would not expand detention 
authority inside of the U.S., that is just not the case.55 
Similar to Congressman McClintock, Conyers pointed out 
the uncertainty in the meaning of terms in section 1021, includ-
ing “hostilities,” what constitutes direct support, and when and 
how hostilities will end.56 Conyers also highlighted that section 
1021 does not specifically address whether U.S. citizens or law-
ful resident aliens may be determined to be “covered persons” 
subject to detention.57 
Democratic Senator Jeff Bingaman echoed concerns regard-
ing section 1021 that the “end of hostilities” is “a completely 
undefined period of time considering that we are confronting a 
long-term conflict with groups, such as al-Qaida, who will nev-
er sign a peace treaty ending the hostilities.”58 
Bingaman also discussed Feinstein’s amendment that section 
1021: 
should not be construed as affecting existing law with re-
spect to the detention of U.S. citizens, but this language 
simply restates that the law is what the law is. The problem 
is the law is unsettled. If Congress is going to enact provi-
sions authorizing the indefinite detention of a person with-
out a trial, frankly, I believe the sensible approach is to be 
very clear about whether or not it is the intent of Congress to 
include American citizens within this category.59 
Interestingly, Congressman Bingaman opposed section 1021 be-
cause the war on terror will never end, while Senator Graham 
supported section 1021 for the same reason. Graham noted dur-
ing the Senate debate that “[t]his is a war without end. There 
will never be a surrender ceremony signing on the USS Mis-
souri,” referring to the end of the war with Japan.60 Graham 
acknowledged that “an enemy combatant determination could 
be a de facto life sentence,” but claimed that the federal courts 
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 58. 157 CONG. REC. S8647 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 2011) (remarks of Sen. Bingaman). 
 59. Id. 
 60. 157 CONG REC. S8103 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011) (remarks of Sen. Graham). 
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provide a check or balance on such detention authority.61 It is 
unclear how Senator Graham would respond to Judge Ses-
sions’ claim that the executive branch has been able to avoid 
this judicial check or balance. 
F. Section 1021 and Civil Liberties 
Democratic Senator Chris Coons referred to section 1021 and 
other detention authorities in the NDAA as “an assault on our 
civil liberties [that] do not belong on our books. They were not 
requested by the Pentagon, in fact they have been resisted by 
the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General 
and the directors of National Intelligence and the FBI.”62 Coons 
claimed the detention provisions “take us one small, but signif-
icant, step down the road towards a state in which ordinary 
citizens live in fear of the military, rather than the free society 
that has marked this great nation since the Bill of Rights was 
ratified 220 years ago, in 1791.”63 
Coons agreed that while it is “acceptable for lethal military 
actions to be taken against U.S. citizens abroad who have taken 
up arms against this Nation, I am concerned about the slow but 
steady creep of the military into areas that traditionally have 
been reserved for civilian law enforcement.”64 And as Coons 
astutely noted: 
At the local level, it is often difficult to distinguish whether 
an individual in possession of bomb-making components is 
a hardened terrorist coordinating with al-Qaeda; is a trou-
bled, dangerous, but [unaffiliated] teenager; or is completely 
innocent of any crime at all. In the rush to “repel borders” at 
the early stages of investigations, mistakes will be made. We 
need to make sure that these mistakes do not overrun the 
constitutional protections we all enjoy as Americans.65 
Coons then issued a poignant reminder of American history 
in dealing with terrorist threats. He acknowledged that: 
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[W]e are in conflict against terrorists. I do not doubt or dis-
pute that. But this is not the first time that has been the case. 
During the beginning part of the last century, anarchists 
committed a string of bombings, usually targeting police of-
ficers or civilians. In 1901, an anarchist assassinated Presi-
dent McKinley. In the First Red Scare during the early part 
of the century, a plot was uncovered to bomb 36 leaders of 
government and industry. During the 1960s and 70s, the 
Weather Underground declared as its mission to overthrow 
the U.S. government. Members planted bombs in the Capi-
tol, the Department of State and the Pentagon. 
Each of these threats, and others, has before placed an exis-
tential fear in the minds of Americans. We have not always 
acted well. The Sedition Act of 1918, the internment of Japa-
nese Americans during the Second World War, and the 
House Un-American Activities Committee and Hollywood 
blacklisting following the war are three notable examples of 
action, taken in the face of severe threat, which now the vast 
majority of Americans look back upon with deep regret.66 
Yet when it came down to voting, Senator Feinstein’s 
amendment to add subsection (e) to section 1021 passed by a 
vote of 99 to 1.67 And with section 1021 contained in the NDAA, 
Congress was unwilling to not approve spending authority for 
the Department of Defense. By December 2011, the Senate 
passed the NDAA by a vote of 93 to 7.68 The House of Repre-
sentatives saw much more disagreement but passed the NDAA 
by a vote of 283 to 136.69 
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 67. 157 CONG REC. S8125 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2011). Republican Senator Jon Kyl of 
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G. Presidential Signing Statement 
President Obama signed the NDAA, with section 1021, into 
law on December 31, 2011.70 He did so while issuing a signing 
statement drawing specific attention to section 1021: 
Today I have signed into law H.R. 1540, the “National De-
fense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.” . . . . The fact 
that I support this bill as a whole does not mean I agree with 
everything in it. In particular, I have signed this bill despite 
having serious reservations with certain provisions that reg-
ulate the detention, interrogation, and prosecution of sus-
pected terrorists . . . . Section 1021 affirms the executive 
branch’s authority to detain persons covered by the 2001 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) (Public Law 
107-40; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note). This section breaks no new 
ground and is unnecessary . . . . I want to clarify that my 
Administration will not authorize the indefinite military de-
tention without trial of American citizens. Indeed, I believe 
that doing so would break with our most important tradi-
tions and values as a Nation. My Administration will inter-
pret section 1021 in a manner that ensures that any detention 
it authorizes complies with the Constitution, the laws of 
war, and all other applicable law.71 
President Obama’s signing statement, like all signing state-
ments, is of little and possibly no legal significance. Signing 
statements are an expression of policy, issued for political rea-
sons. President Obama could act inconsistently with his sign-
ing statement with only political or public relations conse-
quences. One administration’s signing statement is of even less 
significance to a subsequent administration. What is of infinite-
ly more significance is that the Congress enacted section 1021 
and the President signed it into law. 
The legislative and executive branches have spoken, howev-
er unclearly, leaving section 1021 in the hands of the judiciary. 
There have been a few cases which have addressed section 
1021, two on the margins, one more substantively. Ultimately, 
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section 1021 has survived initial challenge, and we still do not 
know its full meaning and import. 
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
A. Khairkhwa 
In December 2012 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir-
cuit issued its opinion in Khairkhwa v. Obama.72 Khairkwha was 
an Afghan national captured in Afghanistan by the United 
States in the fall of 2001 and subsequently transferred to the 
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.73 The Court reject-
ed Khairkwha’s habeas petition challenging his continued de-
tention.74 The significance of Khairkhwa is that the D.C. Circuit 
acknowledged that the NDAA 2012 “affirmed” the President’s 
authority to detain not just al Qaeda and the Taliban responsi-
ble for the September 11th attacks per the AUMF, but any per-
son who substantially supports those groups or “associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States 
or its coalition partners.”75 
Thus the executive branch has pulled off an impressive vari-
ant of the Emperor’s new clothes, convincing the Congress and 
now the judiciary not only that executive authority not other-
wise apparent has always existed since the AUMF, but that 
Congress provided the authority. Yet as previously discussed, 
the AUMF is limited to those responsible for the September 
11th attacks. The 2012 NDAA language is based on the lan-
guage from the March 2009 DOJ filing in which the executive 
branch essentially told Congress either what the AUMF meant 
or what it should be construed to mean. Of course, were that 
the case, Congress would not need to be told what it had done 
or why. If Congress had in fact issued detention authority in 
the AUMF in the way envisioned by the executive branch, 
Congress would need not have included detention authority 
language in the 2012 NDAA. 
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B. Ali 
A similar D.C. Circuit case in 2013, Ali v. Obama,76 further so-
lidified the expansion of the 2012 NDAA’s grant of detention 
authority to the executive branch. Like Khairkhwa, Ali was a 
foreign national captured outside the U.S. and transferred to 
Guantanamo Bay.77 Similarly, the court rejected Ali’s challenge 
to his continued detention.78 Although styled as a concurrence, 
Judge Edwards’s opinion criticizes the majority opinion and 
employs section 1021 to do so. 
Judge Edwards first provides the language from the AUMF 
and labels the 2012 NDAA as adding a provision—a far more 
intellectually honest approach.79 Edwards then analyzes whether 
Ali’s conduct as a personal associate of al Qaeda leader Abu 
Zubaydah fits the criteria of either the AUMF or NDAA.80 Ed-
wards concludes that: 
Nothing in the record indicates that Ali “planned, author-
ized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of September 
11, 2001 or that he “harbored [terrorist] organizations or per-
sons,” or that he was “part of or substantially supported al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces,” or that he “com-
mitted a belligerent act” against the United States.81 
Edwards claims that “there is a clear disjunction between the 
law of the circuit and the statutes that the case law purports to 
uphold. In other words, the ‘personal associations’ test is well 
beyond what the AUMF and NDAA prescribe.”82 Edwards not-
ed that “there is no end in sight” to the U.S. war on terror, in-
deed that “it is likely to continue through Ali’s natural life.”83 
Edwards concluded that “[i]t seems bizarre, to say the least, that 
someone like Ali, who has never been charged with or found 
guilty of a criminal act and who has never ‘planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided [any] terrorist attacks,’ is now marked for a 
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life sentence.”84 Edwards concluded his “concurrence” by asking 
whether habeas corpus proceedings under the AUMF, NDAA, 
and D.C. Circuit case law are “functionally useless.”85 
C. Hedges 
By far the most significant and thorough consideration of 
section 1021 came in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decision Hedges v. Obama.86 A group of journalists and 
activists [the plaintiffs] brought suit against President Obama 
and other U.S. government officials.87 The petitioners sought to 
preemptively block enforcement of section 1021 on the grounds 
that the provision violated their First and Fifth Amendment 
rights under the U.S. Constitution. After the U.S. District Court 
agreed with petitioners and entered a permanent injunction, 
the U.S. government appealed.88 
The court acknowledged that “[a]t first blush, Section 1021 
may seem curious, if not contradictory.”89 Yet ultimately the 
court claimed that the plaintiffs “create[d] a false dilemma 
when they suggest that either Section 1021 expands the AUMF 
detention authority or it serves no purpose.”90 The court ar-
gued that to the extent the grant of detention authority in sec-
tion 1021 differs from the language in the AUMF, it is “not sur-
prising” because, according to the court, “one obviously cannot 
‘detain’ an organization, one must explain how the authority to 
use force against an organization translates into detention au-
thority.”91 In so doing, the court ignores other differences be-
tween the AUMF and section 1021, which are not so easily ex-
plained away. To the AUMF types of activity, “planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided,” section 1021 added being 
part of “or substantially supporting” the undefined “associated 
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forces” which are “directly supporting” hostilities not just the 
United States but also undefined “coalition partners.”92 
Substantively, the Second Circuit made quick work of the 
plaintiffs’ challenge. The court divided the plaintiffs into two 
categories, the two plaintiffs who were U.S. citizens and the 
two non-citizen plaintiffs.93 For the U.S. citizen plaintiffs the 
court noted that: 
While it is true that Section 1021(e) does not foreclose the 
possibility that previously “existing law” may permit the de-
tention of American citizens in some circumstances—a pos-
sibility that Hamdi clearly envisioned in any event—Section 
1021 cannot itself be challenged as unconstitutional by citi-
zens on the grounds advanced by plaintiffs because as to 
them it neither adds to nor subtracts from whatever authori-
ty would have existed in its absence. For similar reasons, 
plaintiffs cannot show that any detention [they] may fear 
would be redressable by the relief they seek, an injunction of 
Section 1021.94 
Here the court was quite literal: “with respect to citizens, 
lawful resident aliens, or individuals captured or arrested in 
the United States, Section 1021 simply says nothing at all.”95 
The court acknowledged “that Section 1021 perhaps could have 
been drafted in a way that would have made this clearer and 
that the absence of any reference to American citizens in Sec-
tion 1021(b) led the district court astray in this case.” 96 
In terms of the non-U.S. citizen plaintiffs, the court claimed that: 
Whereas Section 1021 says nothing about the government’s 
authority to detain citizens, it does have real meaning re-
garding the authority to detain individuals who are not citi-
zens or lawful resident aliens and are apprehended abroad. 
It provides that such individuals may be detained until the 
end of hostilities if they were part of or substantially sup-
ported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. To be 
sure, Section 1021 in substance provides also that this au-
thority was implicit in the original AUMF. But, as discussed 
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above, that the 112th Congress in passing Section 1021 ex-
pressed such a view does not mean that Section 1021 itself is 
a nullity. It is not immediately apparent on the face of the 
AUMF alone that the President had the authority to detain 
those who substantially supported al-Qaeda, and indeed 
many federal judges had concluded otherwise prior to Sec-
tion 1021’s passage. Hence, Section 1021(b)(2) sets forth an 
interpretation of the AUMF that had not previously been 
codified by Congress.97 
The portion of the Hedges opinion which is the most telling 
on both how unclear section 1021 is, and how we do not know 
what it means or how it could be applied in the future, came 
when the Second Circuit faced what it styled as “a somewhat 
peculiar situation.”98 That peculiarity resulted from the gov-
ernment asking the court: 
to resolve standing in this case by codifying, as a matter of 
law, the meaningful limits it has placed on itself in its inter-
pretation of Section 1021. We decline the government’s invi-
tation to do so. Thus, we express no view regarding whether the 
laws of war inform and limit detention authority under Section 
1021(b)(2) or whether such principles would foreclose the deten-
tion of individuals like [the non-citizen plaintiffs]. This issue pre-
sents important questions about the scope of the government’s de-
tention authority under the AUMF, and we are wary of allowing a 
preenforcement standing inquiry to become the vehicle by which a 
court addresses these matters unless it is necessary. Because we 
conclude that standing is absent in any event, we will as-
sume without deciding that Section 1021(b)(2) covers [the 
non-citizen plaintiffs] in light of their stated activities.99 
Perhaps most telling was the court’s comment that “[t]he 
parties raise a number of important and difficult questions, but 
we need not reach most of them.”100 Thus, the court did not 
reach most of the important and difficult questions section 1021 
presents. So section 1021 remains hiding in plain sight. We may 
not know section 1021’s full effect unless and until there is an-
other significant domestic terrorism incident. We can, however, 
already see how the viability of indefinite detention is altering 
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U.S. law enforcement’s approach to civil liberties in domestic 
counterterrorism investigations. 
IV. SECTION 1021 SKEWS THE PUBLIC SAFETY EXCEPTION  
TO MIRANDA 
In the wake of post-September 11th terrorism-related inci-
dents in the United States, questions have arisen about the effi-
cacy and even appropriateness of utilizing a traditional crimi-
nal procedure approach. 101  In response, federal law 
enforcement has been employing an increasingly expansive 
view of the public safety exception (PSE) 102  to the Miranda 
rights warning and waiver requirement. 103 But however expan-
sive its application, the PSE imposed, or used to anyway, a risk 
calculus burden on law enforcement.104 Section 1021 and the 
possibility of indefinite detention fundamentally alters and 
shifts that risk to the terrorism suspect. Given that, as previous-
ly discussed, we do not know the type or quantum of activity 
which renders someone a terrorism suspect, section 1021 may 
result in a significant erosion of U.S. civil liberties. This erosion 
may result from the direct application of section 1021 or indi-
rectly through the expanded use of the PSE by law enforcement 
buttressed by the possibility of indefinite detention.  
In New York v. Quarles, the Supreme Court created the public 
safety exception to Miranda: When law enforcement interrogates 
a suspect in custody in response to an imminent threat of danger 
to the officer or the public, the confession will be admissible 
even if the officer failed to provide Miranda warnings and obtain 
a waiver.105 In linking the exception to Miranda, Justice O’Connor 
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noted that Miranda does not prohibit public safety questioning; 
Miranda simply restricts using the statement as evidence.106 
In essence, Miranda requires the government to employ a risk 
calculus—question a suspect without first advising them of the 
Miranda rights and obtaining a waiver in order to protect the 
public, or advise the suspect and seek a waiver to protect a fu-
ture prosecution. Failing to advise a suspect questioned in a 
custodial setting of his or her Miranda rights may result in the 
government foregoing the opportunity to convict the suspect.107 
Although the expansion of the PSE lessened the need for law 
enforcement to make a choice, section 1021 may eliminate that 
choice all together. Instead of law enforcement having to de-
cide how to prioritize protection of the public versus prosecu-
tion of alleged offenders, terrorism suspects have to make a 
choice: respond to questioning without Miranda warnings and 
have those statements used against you in an Article III court 
or do not respond and risk indefinite detention. This erosion of 
rights can be seen in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
which occurred before section 1021, and the Boston Marathon 
bombing, which occurred after. 
A. Abdulmutallab 
On December 25, 2009, FBI agents questioned Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab at the University of Michigan Hospital.108 Ab-
dulmutallab, a Nigerian citizen, was being treated for burns re-
sulting from his failed attempt to detonate explosives in his un-
derwear during a transatlantic flight from Amsterdam to Detroit 
that same day.109 When the plane landed U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Patrol agents arrested Abdulmutallab and transported him 
to the hospital.110 Thus, at the time of the FBI questioning, Ab-
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dulmutallab was already in custody. Abdulmutallab was not 
advised of his Miranda rights until nine hours after his arrest.111 
During that time, the FBI questioned him about: 
where he traveled, when he had traveled, how, and with 
whom; the details of the explosive device; the details regard-
ing the bomb-maker, including where Defendant had re-
ceived the bomb; his intentions in attacking Flight 253; who 
else might be planning an attack; whether he associated 
with, lived with, or attended the same mosque with others 
who had a similar mind-set as Defendant about jihad, mar-
tyrdom, support for al-Qaeda, and a desire to attack the 
United States by using a similar explosive device on a plane, 
and what these individuals looked like—all in an attempt to 
discover whether Defendant had information about others 
who could be on planes or about to board planes with ex-
plosive devices similar to the one Defendant used because, 
based upon his training, experience, and knowledge of earli-
er al-Qaeda attacks, this was not a solo incident and the po-
tential for a multi-prong attack existed even if Defendant 
was unaware of any specific additional planned attack.112 
Abdulmutallab was prosecuted in U.S. federal court where 
he unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements.113 Fol-
lowing his conviction for, among other offenses, attempting to 
use a weapon of mass destruction, he was sentenced to be 
confined for the duration of his natural life without the possi-
bility of parole.114 His case demonstrates the imprecise scope 
of the PSE. Is the most important criterion the spontaneity of 
unmirandized police questioning in the face of an imminent 
threat? Or is it that law enforcement’s primary objective of 
defusing that imminent threat? 
For context of the current application of the PSE, consider 
Quarles itself. In that case, New York City police apprehended a 
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man in a grocery store suspected of sexual assault.115 The victim 
had flagged down the police and pointed out her assailant, 
Quarles, who proceeded to run into the store.116 When police 
arrested Quarles they noticed he was wearing a empty gun 
holster.117 With Quarles in handcuffs, the police asked about 
the location of the gun.118 The admissibility of that question and 
answer is the basis of the PSE. 
Both the trial and appellate court ruled that the gun police 
seized based on Quarles’s response to their post arrest ques-
tioning was inadmissible.119 The Supreme Court reversed the 
exclusion, siding with the argument of Sol Wachtler, then the 
Queens District Attorney, that there should be an emergency 
exception to Miranda.120 Interestingly though, Wachtler—later a 
judge—has written that: 
resolving immediate emergencies is about as far as we should 
go in delaying the Miranda reading or creating exceptions to 
it. To open non-emergency exceptions, like the one proposed 
by the Obama administration for terrorism suspects, would 
be to go down a road toward the eventual nullification of the 
constitutional protection against self-incrimination. 
The Miranda rule strikes a delicate balance, enabling us to 
protect a fundamental constitutional right without forcing 
the courts to allow the legitimacy of every confession to be 
proven before it is allowed into evidence. To compromise 
the rule would be counterproductive and destructive to the 
kind of freedom we enjoy as Americans — a freedom that 
terrorists would like nothing better than to destroy.121 
The FBI in Abdulmutallab took a calculated risk. They ques-
tioned Abdulmutallab without first advising him of his Miranda 
rights and seeking a waiver. Unlike in Quarles, there was noth-
ing spontaneous about the FBI questioning. This suggests that 
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perhaps the primary objective test was controlling. While courts 
have been receptive to expanding the PSE in terrorism cases,122 
the FBI was still taking a risk: either the statements would fall 
within the public safety exception and be admissible, or they 
would not and could not be used in the government’s case in 
chief. Their exclusion might not have prevented Abdulmu-
tallab’s prosecution but would have made it more challenging. 
In the wake of Abdulmutallab, the FBI purportedly issued 
guidance to its agents encouraging a broad use of the PSE in 
terrorism cases. 123 While the FBI’s course of action in the Ab-
dulmutallab ultimately proved successful, controversy sur-
rounded whether Abdulmutallab should have been read his 
rights at all.124 Calculated risks are still risks. 
At one point Attorney General Eric Holder made statements 
that the Obama Administration would engage Congress on de-
veloping statutory authority for such unwarned questioning of 
terror suspects in the future.125 Holder went so far as to testify 
before the House Committee on the Judiciary that the PSE 
should be “clarified” to ensure it provided the necessary flexi-
bility to permit unwarned questioning of terror suspects.126 It is 
not a coincidence that within a year of the Abdulmutallab case 
and the Attorney General asking for greater flexibility that 
Congress enacted section 1021, which in providing for indefi-
nite detention allows the executive branch to avoid even the 
calculated risk of the Abdulmutallab case. The reason the Attor-
ney General has not renewed his call for statutory expansion of 
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the PSE is because DOJ now has section 1021, which provides 
far greater “flexibility” to law enforcement. 
Because the government may now indefinitely incapacitate 
at least certain terror suspects, the Quarles balance has been 
fundamentally altered. The possibility of indefinite detention 
results in the government no longer having to choose between 
public safety and prosecution. The Department of Justice is 
embracing and defending this flexibility while not acknowl-
edging the risks to civil liberties. According to former Attorney 
General Michael Mukasey: 
The United States has every right to capture and detain en-
emy combatants in this conflict, and need not simply release 
them to the battlefield . . . We have every right to prevent 
them from returning to kill our troops or those fighting with 
us, and to target innocent civilians. And this detention often 
yields valuable intelligence about the intentions, organiza-
tion, operations, and tactics of our enemy. In short, detain-
ing dangerous enemy combatants is lawful, and makes our 
Nation safer . . . [T]o suggest that the government must 
charge detainees with crimes or release them is to seriously 
misunderstand the principal reasons why we detain enemy 
combatants in the first place: it has to do with self-
protection, because these are dangerous people who 
pose threats to our citizens and to our soldiers.127 
To understand the progression, or digression really, that the 
United States is undergoing in terms of civil liberties consider 
how the post-section 1021 Boston Marathon Bombing investi-
gation played out. 
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B. Boston Marathon Bombing 
On April 15, 2013, two bombs exploded on the course of the 
Boston Marathon, killing three and injuring over 200.128  On 
April 18, the FBI released photos identifying two Chechen 
brothers, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, as suspects.129 The 
following day, after several shootouts with law enforcement, 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev was killed and Dzokhar was wounded and 
taken into custody.130 The FBI questioned Dzokhar, a U.S. citi-
zen in the custody of U.S. law enforcement, for some twenty-
seven hours over the course of several days.131  During this 
questioning Dzokhar reportedly requested a lawyer ten 
times.132 Yet unlike in Abdulmutallab, where the FBI advised a 
foreign citizen of his Miranda rights, the FBI never did so for 
Tsarnaev, a U.S. citizen. Only when Tsarneav was presented to 
a U.S. Magistrate did the Magistrate advise him of his rights 
and afford him to the right to consult with an attorney.133 
Yet the hue and cry was not that Tsarneav had been read his 
rights too late, but that he had been read them at all. The criti-
cism came not just from pundits, but from members of Con-
gress. Senator Graham “tweeted” that “[I]f captured, I hope 
[the] Administration will at least consider holding the Boston 
suspect as enemy combatant for intelligence gathering purpos-
es,”134 and that “[T]he last thing we may want to do is read Bos-
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ton [Marathon bombing] suspect Miranda [r]ights telling him 
to ‘remain silent.’”135 
Senator Graham also claimed that the Boston Marathon 
bombing was “Exhibit A of why the homeland is the battle-
field.”136 Continuing to explore their use of social media, fol-
lowing Tsarnaev’s apprehension, Senator McCain joined Sena-
tor Graham in issuing a statement on Facebook stating that: 
Now that the suspect is in custody, the last thing we should 
want is for him to remain silent. It is absolutely vital the sus-
pect be questioned for intelligence gathering purposes. We 
need to know about any possible future attacks which could 
take additional American lives. The least of our worries is a 
criminal trial which will likely be held years from now.  
Under the Law of War we can hold this suspect as a poten-
tial enemy combatant not entitled to Miranda warnings or 
the appointment of counsel. Our goal at this critical juncture 
should be to gather intelligence and protect our nation from 
further attacks. 
We remain under threat from radical Islam and we hope the 
Obama Administration will seriously consider the enemy 
combatant option. 
We will stand behind the Administration if they decide to 
hold this suspect as an enemy combatant.137 
The Department of Justice did not decide to hold Tsarnaev as 
an enemy combatant and instead is prosecuting him through 
the normal civilian federal criminal justice process. 138  Tsar-
naev’s defense lawyers have filed a motion to suppress his 
statements.139 Some legal scholars believe the court will grant 
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the motion,140 and DOJ may well lose the ability to introduce 
the statements at trial. For the Assistant U.S. Attorney prose-
cuting the case, such a ruling is undesirable but frankly not 
significant. Apart from Tsarnaev’s statements, there appears to 
be overwhelming evidence of his guilt.141 So if, and probably 
when, the court excludes the statements, the DOJ will continue 
with the prosecution and have learned a little more about the 
bounds of an expanded PSE. 
But consider how emboldened the FBI was in this case and 
how differently it acted with Tsarnaev than with Abdulmut-
talab. That a U.S. citizen would receive substantially less civil 
liberty protections from the U.S. government than a foreign 
national is surprising and telling. What changed between Ab-
dulmuttalab and Tsarnaev that would explain the difference 
was section 1021. 
Section 1021 was ultimately not needed in Tsarnaev’s case. 
He and his brother appear to have been domestic terrorists.142 
There do not seem to have been ties with foreign terrorist 
groups or follow-on plots. 143  But if the FBI and DOJ had 
thought they needed to detain Tsarnaev indefinitely per Sena-
tors McCain and Graham, there is in section 1021 a statute on 
the books that arguably authorizes such detention. At a mini-
mum section 1021 does not prohibit such detention. 
The FBI was emboldened at least in part because section 1021 
has substantially shifted the burden of risk associated with coun-
terterrorism to the terrorism suspect. Tsarnaev faced a choice of 
either responding to questions without Miranda warnings or a 
lawyer, or accepting the possibility of indefinite detention. Given 
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the amount of evidence against Tsarnaev without his statements, 
had he refused to cooperate, the government would likely have 
still prosecuted him in an Article III court. In that regard, the 
Tsarnaev case does not fully highlight the issues section 1021 
raises. It does, however, demonstrate how law enforcement was 
emboldened in its approach to interrogating a U.S. citizen in the 
United States. The Tsarnaev case may augur how law enforce-
ment will handle future domestic terrorisms—more aggressive-
ly, knowing that if they exceed the bounds of the PSE and there 
is enough admissible evidence to prosecute a terrorist suspect in 
federal court there is the backstop security of indefinite deten-
tion. It’s like bowling with the gutter guards that make it impos-
sible to throw a gutterball. Without the risk of a gutterball, you 
are free to hurl the ball down the lane as hard as you can, receiv-
ing the reward for the increased velocity without the risk from 
the lack of control. Such is the counterterrorism investigation 
world post-section 1021. 
Unlike the response options available to the FBI prior to sec-
tion 1021, the government does not necessarily risk the ability 
to prosecute successfully (due to inadmissibility of the confes-
sion)—and thereby incapacitate—a terrorist suspect if a viola-
tion of Miranda results in inadmissibility of the suspect’s con-
fession. Rather, the government may now both question in 
violation of the Miranda warning and waiver requirement and 
then incapacitate the suspect through indefinite detention. If 
either this current erosion of civil liberties, or the prospect of 
what section 1021 may ultimately yield, is disconcerting, then 
we should do and say something. 
V. LACK OF DISCUSSION 
Moving forward, there are two courses of action, or three if we 
consider doing nothing. While sometimes appropriate as a course 
of action, doing nothing is not a legitimate option in this setting. 
When faced with difficult questions and issues, we should not, we 
cannot, be the proverbial ostrich plunging its head into the sand. 
There are therefore two courses of action, and each involves wres-
tling with the conception of detention of non-state actors involved 
in or with al Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces. 
When we have this discussion is simply a question of timing. 
We can have the discussion now—calmly, deliberately, as dispas-
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sionately as can be the case, given the subject matter—or we can 
have the discussion during round-the-clock news coverage fol-
lowing the next terrorist attack, and we can have it in thirty-
second sound bites. We would all agree which discussion is more 
likely to lead to a detention policy that better balances our sense of 
security and freedom, both in that moment and moving forward. 
Our grandparents’ generation, which detained thousands of 
Japanese-Americans, and our parents’ generation, which overre-
acted to fears of communist infiltration, show the dangers of wait-
ing. America as a country and as a people should have learned 
from these mistakes. These generations, however, were largely 
good people who as a society made regrettable decisions out of 
fear. We are in the midst of making decisions, or not opposing 
decisions made in our name, which will have equally untoward 
outcomes. As one member of Congress claimed, section 1021 
“take[s] us one small, but significant, step down the road towards 
a state in which ordinary citizens live in fear of the military, rather 
than the free society that has marked this great nation . . . .”144 
The components which yield this undesirable, undemocratic 
outcome are right in front of us: a federal statute that authoriz-
es indefinite detention of we are not exactly sure who, nor for 
exactly what conduct, juxtaposed against what even members 
of the judiciary label a functionally useless habeas corpus re-
gime. The components are right in front of us. They will ulti-
mately be brought into sharp focus in the aftermath of a do-
mestic terrorism incident in which there is not overwhelming 
evidence of guilt such that a traditional prosecution is possible. 
There the government, our government, may take the next 
step, one provided for by section 1021, to indefinitely detain 
U.S. citizens captured in the United States for conduct that al-
legedly occurred in the United States. 
Thus far all three branches of government have acted regard-
ing section 1021. If we the people are not satisfied and if we 
want to readjust how the United States is balancing security 
and liberty, then we need to take action. The first step in that 
direction is to have a public conversation, a public debate, and 
to have it now. 
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